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ABSTRACT 
The following study tries to develop a new perspective on the readings 
of philosophical texts that are based on the auto/biographies of the 
philosophers. In this path this study takes philosophy not an objective 
representation of truth but a writing as Jacques Derrida does. In this picture, 
philosopher is not a demigod telling the reader a sublime truth but is a writer. 
This means putting the life, chance and contingency to a philosophical text. In 
this manner, this study tries to exceed the limits and the boundaries of life and 
text, which are guarded by institutions such as self, authorship, unity of the 
book, philosophy, academy and so on. By way of this, this study tries to find 
the ways to read the philosophical text considering the concept of 
auto/biographical which dwells on the boundaries between life and text. 
ÖZET 
Aşağıdaki çalışma filozofların oto/biyografileri üzerinden temellenen, 
felsefi metin okumalarına ilişkin olarak yeni bir perspektif geliştirmeyi 
hedeflemektedir. Bu bakımdan, bu çalışma felsefeyi hakikatin objektif bir 
temsili olarak değil, Jacques Derrida gibi bir yazı olarak ele almaktadır. Bu 
resimde filozof da okura yüce hakikati anlatan bir yarı-tanrı değil, bir yazardır. 
Bu, felsefi metne yaşamı, şansı ve olumsallığı katmak anlamına gelir. Bu 
anlamda, elinizdeki çalışma kendilik, yazarlık, kitabın birliği, felsefe, akademi 
vb kurumlar tarafından korunan, yaşam ve metin arasındaki sınırları aşmaya 
çalışmaktadır. Bu şekilde, yaşam ve metnin sınırlarında ikamet eden felsefi 
metni, oto/biyografik olanı hesaba katarak okumanın yollarını aramaktadır. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction: and Beginnings  
Although an introduction is the ‘beginning’ of a text, a body of texts 
or a book, it is symptomatically much easier for some to write the introduction 
part after the end of the writing process. Indeed, it would be reasonable to 
assume that the ‘thing’ which will be introduced is supposed to be existent and 
known before the introduction. Main corpus is pre-introduction in this sense, 
and the grasp of the main corpus would serve as a measurement for the success 
of the introduction. The writer should be able to finalize the main corpus to 
introduce it, and in a circular fashion, the introduction would become a 
conclusion at the same time.  
The preface would announce in the future tense (‘this is what 
you are going to read’) the conceptual content or significance 
… of what will already have been written. (Derrida 1981) 
 
Alongside the emphasis on the conception of time in the text, Jacques 
Derrida also points out another function of introduction, which is the placement 
of text among the others. In this manner, delimiting the time and place of the 
text in a logic with margins, borders and limits, the book works in this basic 
order that also serves as a basic formula. In this ‘rational’ order of timeline and 
placement, any writing should consist of an introduction, main corpus and a 
conclusion. To constitute the economy and watch over the strategy of writing 
which will guarantee a fair exchange of texts, there should always be an 
absolute beginning and an end of writing and it should also be incarnated in the 
form of book’s material, physical being. The “unity of book,”(Derrida 1981) 
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however, also risks to reduce ‘writing’ to a mere graphical operation and a kind 
of representation of truth in a rational, measured and organized fashion. Hence, 
this rationality proper to writer-subject requires a self-limitation which doubly 
binds him with the internal necessities of his subjectivity and author-ity as well 
as outer necessities of his subject-object. 
The idea of the book is the idea of totality, finite or infinite, 
of the signifier; this totality of the signifier cannot be a 
totality, unless a totality constituted by the signified preexists 
it, supervises its inscriptions and its signs, and is independent 
of it in its ideality. The idea of the book, which always refers 
to a natural totality, is profoundly alien to the sense of 
writing.(Derrida 1998, 18) 
 
Here, one should at least recall “the necessity of those ‘blank spaces’ 
which we know, at least since Mallarmé, ‘take on importance’ in every text.”  
(Derrida 1981, 3) As to this writing, the following study, in a broad sense, is 
dedicated to reflect on those “blank spaces” from a point of view of the 
autobiography of the thinker/philosopher as a writer. In this manner, the 
relationship between life and work of the writer would be put into question 
from different perspectives. Yet, one of the most common reactions to the 
problem of life/work is a general and unquestioned admittance of the influence 
of the personal life of the writer on the text. This is not a genuine effort to 
question the mentioned problem, but a desperate attempt to close the gap and to 
fill in the blank spaces with the personal life of the writer in a generality. This 
extended generality works with some different “non-synonymous 
supplements” which attach the work an auto-biographical a priori with 
recourse to “the unity of the subject.”  
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In this sense, the question is typically deferred or found unsubstantial, 
since the possible answers are self-evident and risky. It risks considering a 
fragmented subject, resistant to over-determination, and a text which cannot be 
a book in its disunity. “If I distinguish the text from the book, I shall say that 
the destruction of the book as it is now under way in all domains, denudes the 
surface of the text.” (Derrida 1998, 18) This study, however, tries to take the 
risk and to guarantee itself at the same time, with its direct and indirect 
references to Jacques Derrida. Though it is not and cannot be an appropriate, 
proper scholarship of one philosopher, since Derrida himself takes the 
philosophy as a writing which is “delimited, as is any literary genre, not by 
form or matter, but by tradition - a family romance involving, e.g., Father 
Parmenides, honest old uncle Kant, and bad brother Derrida.” (Rorty 1978, 
143)  
Therefore, I do not speak about a philosopher -a concept which should 
also be questioned in terms of law of genre, gender, institutional affiliations 
and so on- or his views, but his words, signatures and proper names. If the 
signatures and proper names are so-called outside markers of the text, the 
question of life/work in “theory” or philosophy requires considering 
philosophy as writing. For Rorty, whereas the tradition of Western metaphysics 
assumes a competency of the philosopher for a better representation of the 
represented, Derrida considers philosophy as a kind of writing, a genre 
“defined by neither subject nor method nor institutional affiliation, but only by 
an enumeration of the mighty dead.” (Rorty 1977, 679) Thus, the text you read 
cannot be a representation of the truth of the life/work, but the writing just after 
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the reading of some philosopher/writers such as Jacques Derrida, Richard 
Rorty and so on.  
Then, the chance is also at work in the work of philosophy; a chance 
which escapes from calculation and over-determination under the names of 
singularity, contingency and subjectivity against the aim of ‘objective’ 
representation of theory. For that reason, any autobiographical impulse in the 
account of philosophical text is proscribed, since it risks the subject, the 
method and the institution of philosophy itself. The bold limits surrounding the 
life with subjectivity and identification, and the work with the unity of the book 
tries to keep safe a philosophy which denies its textuality. The limits and 
borders between the life/text of the philosopher and the work/text of 
philosophy guard the security of the standards of a proper philosophy.  
As Derrida points out in The Ear of the Other, however, there are 
some names and signatures, like Nietzsche’s, which blur the distinction of 
life/work, signifying not the one or the other, but two sides at the same time, 
the side of life and the side of writing. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche speaks about 
the life, even the “monstrous” future life of his name and work in this sense. 
Hence, there is the life of the text and a life in the text as well as a textuality 
in/of life qua autobiography. Autobiography, here, is not a finite graphical 
process, but an auto/oto writing in the face and the ear of the other.  
Before following this path and reflecting on what I would like to call 
the auto/biographical in the future of this study, let me try to speak about my 
beginning(s), my chances (Derrida 2007, 344) for this writing have begun long 
before the introduction, at some time which I cannot detect, but only trace with 
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a recourse to my memory. Nonetheless, remembering Freud, one should also 
recall that the past memories are both constituted and subject to change by the 
present which is in turn somehow constituted by memory. In this sense, this is 
nothing but a story, in one way or another, a narrative what one may naively 
call the life story of this study: “whose unfinished movement assigns itself no 
absolute beginning, and which, although it is entirely consumed by the reading 
of the other texts, in a certain fashion refers only to its own writing.” (Derrida 
1981, 3) 
In a lecture held in Istanbul, in which I had the chance to participate, 
Gayatri C. Spivak stressed the autobiographical aspect of Edward Said’s 
monumental work Orientalism and thus, offered the reader that one should read 
this piece not as a universal text applicable anywhere and anytime to all 
conditions, but as a particular view of Said towards the world, and of the East 
and West. (Spivak 2007) In her reading, Spivak tends to interpret Orientalism 
not as an uncontroversial masterpiece but as an immigrant young man’s 
academic efforts to define and understand the world and his self. By this 
reading, Spivak does not undervalue Said’s Orientalism, but she implies a 
more refined kind of reading of Orientalism including the autobiographical 
accordingly.  
As one of my beginnings and chances, this reading/writing of Spivak 
raises the question of Said’s proper name and signature which is constituted by 
a certain biographical a priori. Not surprisingly, this biography is founded 
upon the world’s worlding as East and West geographically. In this map, Said’s 
proper name and signature is written and registered under the grand name of 
Orient and fixed for many. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that (I) 
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there’s no one signature, but different signatures of Said as well other writers, 
and (II) a biography is a story which tells only one story in place of another. 
The proper name given to Said reveals how this fixation of interpretation and 
the claim of unity of the name and signature try to determine the reading and 
close it as an ideological and political investment.  
Here, Said and some other “oriental writers” are subject to a kind of 
representation that may be called bio-geo-graphical, in which one can see the 
traces of a sort of orientalism. In a possible example of these romantic bio-geo-
graphies, the in-between Oriental writer who has a painful and also eccentric 
life is also a success story:  
She is a clear evidence of that if an oriental youngster wants much; 
she can become an elite member of civilized Western community. They are the 
bodily evidences of liberal Western world’s openness to the others who 
deserves that by working the Western Canon hard. They are exemplars to all 
other Oriental students and young writers: perfect degrees at schools, a 
wonderful CV, a perfect English, an avant-garde style and a brave warrior 
who temporarily comes back to homeland to oppose the injustices of this 
economically, culturally, politically and intellectually poor territory. As the 
story goes, we can see that the heroic oriental intellectual becomes a 
monumental figure for her successes both in the West and the Orient.  
Interestingly, what enables her to act as a champion in the West and a 
hero in the Orient is nothing but her interesting, traveling biography which 
allows her to become universal to a certain extent. Turning back to Spivak’s 
intervention, it should be emphasized that Spivak insists not only on Said’s 
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work’s autobiographical character, but also the construction of his bio-geo-
graphical representation as an object (Spivak 2007, 23). Indeed, seemingly, 
most of the writers as well as readers are not interested in Said’s texts but in 
this bio-geo-graphical representation which also applies the metaphor-concepts 
of exile or hybridism quite easily. For Spivak, this is an obstacle for the 
appreciation of Said’s work, because it is directing the reader to both an easy 
and immediate reading, and a lack of critique that suspends any genuine 
reading.  
Spivak’s lecture was delivered to a Turkish audience and her emphasis 
on the production and circulation of Said’s proper name was presented with a 
certain reference to Said’s own emphasis on critique and solidarity. In this 
sense, the source of my ironic version of Said-like persons’ bio-geo-graphical 
representation has something to do with the tone of her warnings. Certainly, 
there are many other versions circulating around, using or abusing what Said 
calls critique or solidarity. Nonetheless, what is at stake here is not only the 
question of criticism but the bio-geo-graphical account in the reading of Said’s 
text.  
Furthermore, it should be admitted that not only Said, but all writers 
are subject to a biographical representation, if not bio-geo-graphical. One can 
list some other obvious examples of these popular representations, from 
Nietzsche to Foucault and from Kant to Wittgenstein, all have a different life-
story seemingly written by the reader, whether he is a meticulous scholar or a 
sloppy beginner. The point here is not to offer a better representation or a more 
refined kind of scholarship but to question how this representation is at work in 
the reading/writing.  
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The reading of Spivak allows us to see how a ‘general’ account of the 
relation of life/work operates in our readings as an attempt to fill in the blank 
spaces with a life-story or a life-writing. Nonetheless, in what we call 
“representation of writer,” the thing, the object as Spivak offers, which carries 
out the narration of life is the proper name and signature. In this manner, the 
appropriate life-story would help the reader to fix and stabilize the signature of 
the writer and assume its unity with a certain reference to the writer’s unite and 
finite subjectivity. The story written, however, is not written by the reader nor 
the writer but it is given, since (I) this graph which is attached to the proper 
name and signature as a biography is not necessarily a graphical operation, not 
an inscription, and (II) this biographical writing in reading or this biographical 
reading in writing cannot be directed or regulated by a finite or complete 
subject.  
Indeed, even the writer himself cannot totally control his proper name 
or signature, and cannot hold its property properly, since the proper name is 
always given to him. As to property and control of the text, although the 
signature is left in the head of the text to guard the text in the name of the 
writer, the signature does already belong to the others in its textuality: the text 
lives its life and dies its death among the others texts. However, this does not 
mean that there is a world of texts which is pure present. On the contrary, as it 
is seen in the example of Said, the proper name and signature, which are 
assumed extra-textual, live their lives inside the text textually.  
As Derrida suggests in his reading of Nietzsche (Derrida 1988), 
proper names do have a nominal effect in the system of writing, although they 
are supposed to be functioning not only outside the text but also the language. 
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Nonetheless, the name “Edward Said” does not only refer to his biological self, 
but also to a biography and concepts written and registered graphically and 
non-graphically. Therefore, the proper name refers to something re-produced 
again and again, and has a meaning just like described in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception of “conceptual persona”: 
The conceptual persona is not the philosopher’s 
representative, but, rather, the reverse: the philosopher is only 
the envelop of his principal conceptual persona and of all the 
other personae who are the intercessors 
(Fürsprecher/intercesseurs), the real subjects of his 
philosophy. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 64) 
 
In this context, let me remind the reader how it was shocking for 
many, when the proper name of famous Yale critic Paul de Man was 
necessarily attached to an unexpected biography. Whereas his name refers to 
Yale, deconstruction, and to a friend and “ally” of Jacques Derrida, after his 
death, it is discovered that during the World War II de Man wrote some two 
hundred articles for a pro-Nazi newspaper, some of them explicitly anti-
Semitic. Leaving aside the other examples of such scandals regarding the 
proper names such as Heidegger and Nietzsche, it is to be noted that the 
scandalous events become scandalous also because they were not predicted by 
the textual system.  
The scandal, then, is also the failure of this system which cannot 
achieve to assign a proper biography to proper name. The scandalous event 
produces a crisis of signature and creates a shockwave which disables one to 
interpret the text after the collapse of the secure relation of biography and 
proper name. It is because the re-production and circulation of proper names 
and signatures in the system gives the reader a prescription of reading and 
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interpreting the texts. That prescription offering a pharmakon to the reader 
works against the monstrosity of, say, Nietzsche’s, Heidegger’s and de Man’s 
life/text. Not surprisingly, Derrida discusses the question of the politics of 
interpretation with recourse to these proper names and signatures in his texts. 
The decision of interpretation offered by the machine of politics of 
interpretation, which is authorized by academic and educational institutions, 
and publishing industry, aims to close the other possible readings or to 
privilege some of them. In any case, it envisages an order which is necessarily 
political and ideological. The example of Said displays how his texts are being 
more or less closed to reading by a biographical representation attached to his 
proper name. Then, it can be said that (I) the biographical is always inside the 
text via signature and proper name, (II) the proper name and signature which 
always live longer than the biological self have a nominal effect that also 
works for fixing and stabilizing the meaning of the text, and (III) for there is no 
one signature, one proper name or one biography, the text is always under the 
risk of being occupied by the unpredictable forces of life/text. All these point 
out to the worldly character of texts, a world which is not pure in any sense.  
Texts have ways of existing, both theoretical and practical, 
that even in their most rarefied form are always enmeshed in 
circumstance, time, place, and society – in short, they are in 
world, and hence are worldly. (Said 1975, 4) 
 
Just like the world Said mentioned is impure with circumstance and so 
on, the world of the texts is not a pure world of better and better representations 
of truth but a system of interrelationships of graphical and non-graphical texts. 
As the impure world of texts includes what we call ‘life in the text,’ the 
graphical and non-graphical texts pertaining to auto-biography work in the text 
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as another text via the signatures and proper names. Just like Said stresses that 
the texts are “enmeshed in circumstance, time, place, and society,” we saw 
above how his work is trapped with political and ideological connotations by 
his signatures which carry the attached biographies.  
Thus, ‘the life of the text’ comes to term with ‘the life in the text’ in 
the world of texts. Dwelling in the borderline between life and work, the 
system of signatures and the proper names constitutes the general economy of 
exchange and directs the politics of interpretation accordingly. The signature 
signs a writer, assigns a subject to the text, a subject who is responsible for the 
text before the law and who has the right to own it, a right to claim that it is a 
property of someone, a property registered with a proper name. In this sense, 
signature is constitutive of being-in-the-text institutionally, and it lawfully 
engages one with a variety of institutions, such as literature, philosophy, 
university, law and so on. To refer Said’s insights, playfully deforming the 
Heideggerian concepts, it can be said that being-in-the-text is already subject to 
the existential conditions of being-in-the-world.  
As to Said’s insights, what he calls “being enmeshed in” should also 
be considered from the viewpoint of representational writing. Why does Said 
prefer to use such a word with negative connotations while he is claiming the 
worldly character of text, as if he is mourning for a dream or speaking about 
unfairness befell to the text unexpectedly? The dream which cannot come true 
and thus collapses displays an understanding of textuality which considers the 
duty of the text as truthfully representing the truth via writing. In accordance 
with this dream or the ideal, in the tradition what Rorty called “Kantian,” 
philosophy is not understood as a writing, and therefore the philosophical work 
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should be a minimal text, a text in which the writing should be in its minimum 
for writing can only be a means for philosophical text. (Rorty 1978)  
In this manner, the latest development in Kantian tradition is 
philosophy of language which aims to “show how the atemporally true can be 
contained in spatio-temporal vehicle, regularize the relation between man and 
what man seeks by exhibiting its ‘structure,’ freezing the historical process of 
successive reinterpretations by exhibiting the structure of all possible 
interpretation.” (Rorty 1978, 144) Accordingly, the writing should end as soon 
as possible, when philosopher finished his work in a book in its unity. 
Although philosophy aims its death in this sense, the philosophical text lives its 
life and writing would lead to more writing.  
Hence, the philosophical text is impure and contaminated by writing, 
for it is necessarily a text. Philosophical text is enmeshed in the world and in 
the world of texts by (I) its worldly character, and by (II) its textuality which 
can neither be utterly limited nor finished by the borders of book’s supposed 
unity. As to the auto-biographical in theory/philosophy, according to what is 
offered so far, the life in the text is one of the most resistant forces 
contaminating philosophical text against its presupposed representational unity. 
It can be claimed that the life/text of the philosopher lives a life in the 
theoretical/philosophical text and it is at work in the work through the forces of 
life that are resistant to delimitation of the text in the form of book with a 
beginning and an end.  
In the following chapters, with a certain recourse to differentiation of 
life/work and the limits and borders which tries to keep safe the purity of 
philosophical/theoretical work between them. As it is claimed so far, the 
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worldly and textual character of the philosophical work destabilizes these 
limits and boundaries of life/work internally. Although these limits are at work, 
they do not and cannot possibly work properly. In this manner, to show how it 
is impossible to separate life and work properly as it is prescribed by the 
tradition of philosophy, I tried to refer to life of the text and life in the text by 
focusing Derrida’s interpretations of Nietzsche’s signatures.  
As will take the name of “the work of pure reason” in this study, with 
a reference to Robert Smith’s Derrida and Autobiography (Smith 1995), and 
Rorty’s articles cited above, I would like to focus more on the differentiation of 
life/work in the future of this study. Yet, here, in the threshold of the closure of 
introduction and the beginning of another chapter, let me briefly point how the 
work of pure reason delimiting life and work -both theoretically and 
practically- works in our textbooks, in our classrooms or in encyclopedias: (I) 
On the one hand, we separate life and work of a writer, under the titles of 
“his/her life” and “his/her works” as complete, unite and different 
compartments, and (II) we combine them with some representations -written 
by the machinery system of signatures and proper names, and ordered by the 
institutions of academy, publishing industry and so on- without any rigor or 
elaboration. 
Parasiting Derrida, this is what I tried to describe as (I) a logic fed by 
denial and ignorance, and authorized by constitution and application of the 
unity of book and subjectivity, which seemingly clear-cut differentiates the life 
and work, and (II) common non-responses to the question of life/work with a 
general and unquestioned admittance of the influence of the personal life of the 
writer in the text. Whereas these borderlines and limits of life/work cannot 
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work, also the general ideas based on auto-biographical a priori violently use, 
misuse and abuse this polarity. The question of life/work, therefore, is not only 
a question of good/bad reading but also a pedagogical, ethical and political 
problem. The modest claim of this study is, at least, not to make as if there is 
nothing to question in this relation of life/work.  
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Chapter 2 - Post-Introduction: ‘Derrida’   
The name ‘Derrida’ designates an abstruse thinker and 
incomprehensible writer for many, which seems to be a sort of anti-intellectual 
insult. He is mostly introduced to the potential reader and students as one of the 
most complicated writers, if not a semi-intelligible “post-” thinker. In 
accordance with this general representation, Derrida’s “impurity, anomaly and 
monstrosity” is also registered and publicized by some twenty academics, in 
what is called the Cambridge Affair. (Derrida 1995) In 1992, some 
philosophers, including Barry Smith and Willard van Orman Quine, tried to 
stop the granting him of an honorary doctorate by Cambridge University. 
Below are some sentences taken from their warning letter to The London 
Times:  
M. Derrida describes himself as a philosopher, and his 
writings do indeed bear some of the marks of writings in that 
discipline. Their influence, however, has been to a striking 
degree almost entirely in fields outside philosophy -- in 
departments of film studies, for example, or of French and 
English literature.… In the eyes of philosophers, and 
certainly among those working in leading departments of 
philosophy throughout the world, M. Derrida's work does not 
meet accepted standards of clarity and rigor.… Academic 
status based on what seems to us to be little more than semi-
intelligible attacks upon the values of reason, truth, and 
scholarship is not, we submit, sufficient grounds for the 
awarding of an honorary degree in a distinguished university. 
(Derrida 1995, 419-421) 
Without need to any extra effort for interpretation, these words in their 
“clarity,” give a brief idea about the intolerable crime of transgression 
committed by Derrida: Although he describes himself as a philosopher, he is 
not; because his writings’ “influence has been to a striking degree almost 
entirely in fields outside philosophy.” This influence is the evidence of that he 
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is outside of the disciplinary borderlines of philosophy which are guarded by 
the so-called “values of reason, truth, and scholarship.” The other disciplines, 
however, which are not guarded by the foundations of an acceptable 
philosophy, are invaded by passion, contingency, singularity, and so on. 
Indeed, they must have been radically and originally different than philosophy. 
Let alone this clear-cut differentiation of academic disciplines, Derrida claims 
that “there is nothing outside of the text!”(Derrida 1998, 158). Certainly, this 
infamous motto does not claim that these separated fields of study are identical, 
but textuality cannot be reduced in any way. Even life itself is a text after 
theory.  
And as you very well know, when I said ‘there is nothing out 
of the text’ I did not mean the text in the sense of what is 
written in a book; I first generalized the concept of text, of 
trace -‘text’ is not just, say literature or philosophy but life in 
general. Life after theory is a text.(Derrida 2004, 27) 
 
The auto/biographical, in this sense, is a text in a way which is 
conceptually generalized by Derrida, a life/text living and dying in the text. 
Despite the efforts to guard the borders of philosophy with standards of purity 
in general, philosophical text is contaminated by textuality and therefore, by 
the auto/biographical. In an interview held just a few months after the affair, 
Derrida replied a question regarding the reasons of these attacks. Let me quote 
his reply which will somehow shape the fate of this study, leaving its marks 
and traces, from an unclear beginning to an unknown end:    
If these blindly passionate and personal attacks are often 
concentrated on me alone (while sometimes maintaining that 
it isn't me but those who "follow" or "imitate" me who are 
being accused--an all too familiar pattern of argument), that's 
no doubt because "deconstructions" query or put into 
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question a good many divisions and distinctions, for example 
the distinction between the pretended neutrality of 
philosophical discourse, on the one hand, and existential 
passions and drives on the other, between what is public and 
what is private, and so on. More and more I have tried to 
submit the singularity that is writing, signature, self-
presentation, "autobiographical" engagement (which can 
also be ethical or political) to the most rigorous--and 
necessary--philosophical questioning. (Derrida 1995, 410) 
 
In his attacks to the “values of reason, truth, and scholarship,” 
Derrida’s monstrosity begins with a lack of “clarity and rigor” and causes him 
to stay out of philosophy. The source of this lack is most of all an “admixture 
of the elements of the life with those of the work”(Smith 1995, 5), which has 
much to do with the monstrosity both clearly announced and affirmed in 
Jacques Derrida’s writing. In this manner, let me underline two divisions put 
into question here by Derrida: (I) “the pretended neutrality of the philosophical 
discourse, and existential passions and drives on the other,” and (II) “public 
and private.” In this context, what is unacceptable is the fact that Derrida 
becomes “the philosopher of philosophy, where philosophy is just the self-
consciousness of the play of a certain kind of writing,” (Rorty 1978, 153) and 
that he tries to “submit the singularity that is writing, signature, self-
presentation, ‘autobiographical’ engagement (which can also be ethical or 
political) to the most rigorous--and necessary--philosophical questioning.”  
For that reason, “in the eyes of philosophers, and certainly among 
those working in leading departments of philosophy throughout the world,” 
what is happening here is much worse than ‘bad’ philosophy or non-
philosophy: with literary and autobiographical elements, he poisons 
philosophy. That is, he does not recognize and respect the very distinction 
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between life and work: He transgresses the borders aggressively and confuses 
them intentionally. In addition, he is not the only one leaving the standards of a 
proper philosophy. From Sophistry to philosophy of the dark middle ages and 
from Oriental philosophy to Nietzsche, there has been a long tradition of 
poisoned philosophy. Just to mention one, Derrida points out in 
Otobiographies (Derrida 1988), that Nietzsche is the transferential figure 
“which most complicates the supposed division between life and work.” He is 
daring to a great degree that he offers that “I do not believe that a ‘drive to 
knowledge’ is the father of philosophy.”(Nietzsche 2003, 37) Hence, according 
to the machinery system of proper names, he is deemed as a “crazy 
philosopher,” a representative of the cliché of “mad, genius philosopher.” 
Gradually it has become clear to me what every great 
philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession 
of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious 
memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every 
philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the 
whole plant had grown. (Nietzsche 2003, 37) 
 
The naughty game Derrida played following Nietzsche’s signatures is 
therefore at the margins of philosophy. Indeed, when he titles one of his texts 
as ‘Mes chances’ in French, this word would echo as “Méchant” in a playful 
way (Smith 1995, 37): Being “méchant,” i.e., crude, cruel, filthy and malicious, 
he wanders around the limits and boundaries, gets close to the law, touches and 
plays with it and gets some kind of pleasure of transgression. One should not 
forget, however, Freud and the theory of masochism, in which pleasure and 
punishment somehow goes together, hand in hand. Exposing philosophy to the 
life, to the personal and contingent, taking his chances, risking the value and 
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the standard, he follows his desire which is towards pleasure and punishment at 
the same time.  
Reminding the sinful origins and the confessional character of 
autobiography, this writing would turn to itself and takes its revenge against 
itself, again and again: It would be a self-attack or a suicide by poisoning. Let 
me remind that Derrida speaks about pharmakon in his several texts, first of all 
in “Plato’s Pharmacy” in Dissemination (Derrida 1981), which is “neither 
remedy nor poison, neither good nor evil, neither the inside nor the outside, 
neither speech nor writing.” (Derrida 1981, 43) In this path, the one poisoning 
philosophy is neither him nor Nietzsche. Actually, it cannot be someone, but 
philosophy itself. Indeed, “the project of a pure reason finds itself irremediably 
poisoned by a foreign body perversely necessary to it, both poison and cure.” 
(Smith 1995, 7)  
This foreign body is the life itself. The indeterminable, immeasurable, 
ungraspable forces of life take some forms which I would like to call 
auto/biographical. One should be careful about using the concept of “form,” 
since the well-known opposition of form-essence would lead one to reduce 
these forces of life and to a priori fictions described in chapter I. This slip of 
tongue, however, is itself symptomatic: 
Reading…cannot legitimately transgress the text toward 
something other than it, toward the referent (a reality that is 
metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward 
a signifier outside the text, whose content could take place, 
could have taken place outside of language, that is to say, in 
the sense that we give here to that word, outside of writing in 
general. (Derrida 1998, 158) 
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Like it is described in the account of Said and others, we saw the 
operations of linking life and work in a loose fashion, referring to biographical 
details as self-evident referents. Transgressing the text and denying the textual 
and worldly character of these biographical data, textually captured elements 
of the life of the writer are unquestioningly served to the interpretation of a 
text, or of a proper name. Moreover, the author-ity regarding this biographical 
data gives one the right to speak of a writer, of a proper name confidently in 
the conventional realm of academic and publishing industry. In the movie 
Derrida directed by Amy Ziering Kofman and Kirby Dick, Derrida says “that’s 
why I would say sometimes the one who reads a text by a philosopher, for 
instance a tiny paragraph, interprets it in a rigorous, inventive and powerfully 
deciphering fashion is more a real biographer than those who know the whole 
story.” (Dick and Kofman 2002) 
We should not neglect the fact that some biographies by 
people who have authority in the academy finally invest this 
authority in a book which for centuries sometimes after the 
death of an author presents the truth. Someone who is 
interested in biography writes life and works of Heidegger 
well-documented, apparently consistent and it is the only one 
published under the authority of a good press. And then 
Heidegger’s image, Heidegger’s life image is fixed and 
stabilized for centuries.(Dick and Kofman 2002) 
  
In a so-called delicate, comprehensive and competent way, some 
experts have the right to insert what we may call biographical into the reading 
of the text. Referring to the extra-textual being, to a general and obvious data 
witnessed and documented, the monopoly of interpretation becomes 
established. And the legitimate sons and inheritors, authorized distributors 
possess the right to fix and distribute the interpretation and the image of a 
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writer (Derrida 1994). The others are bastards. Here, risking anomaly, Derrida 
challenges the reign of the authority of authorized dealers and invites the 
unauthorized to read and interpret without any fear of authority. 
As you know, the traditional philosophy excludes biography, 
considers biography as something external to philosophy. 
You remember Heidegger’s statement about Aristotle. 
Heidegger once was, I think, asked “What was the life of 
Aristotle?” What could be the answer of this question: “What 
was Aristotle’s life?” The answer was simple. Aristotle was a 
philosopher. The answer comes in one sentence: “He was 
born, he thought and he died.” All the rest is pure anecdote. 
(Dick and Kofman 2002)   
 
Heidegger tries to strengthen the borders between life/work to ensure 
a proper reading of the text by leaving the biographical aside and he is distant 
to biographical representations possibly living in an interpretation of a 
philosophical text or a philosopher. Nevertheless, for Derrida, it is impossible 
to distinguish the forces of life and of text. In this manner, neither ignoring the 
forces of life in the text nor clearing the philosophical text from these forces is 
impossible.  
In this context, the distinction between life and work, the boundaries 
and the limits of the two in a relation is to be put into question. If there is a 
relation, that is, if they are two and one in a relation, there is an other 
who/which always and in many ways exists in that relation. And a law would 
delineate the legitimate connections and illegitimate transgressions in this 
relationship. This is the law of genre that always keeps an eye on the text, 
according to which any form of relation would be interpreted to be constitutive 
or destructive. “Thus, as soon as genre announces itself, one must respect a 
norm, one must not cross a line of demarcation, and one must not risk impurity, 
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anomaly, or monstrosity.” (Derrida and Ronell 1980, 57) Reminding the 
emphasis above regarding the division between public and private, Derrida 
would claim:   
The whole enigma of genre springs perhaps most closely 
from within this limit between the two genres of genre which, 
neither separable nor inseparable, form an odd couple of one 
without the other in which each evenly serves the other a 
citation to appear in the figure of the other, simultaneously 
and indiscernibly saying "I" and "we," me the genre, we 
genres, without it being possible to think that the "I" is a 
species of the genre "we."(Derrida and Ronell 1980) 
 
 
As if it is possible to measure the weight of I and We, of life and 
work, of auto/biographical traces and all-encompassing philosophical truth, the 
law of genre tries to delimit them and find a way to make the appropriate 
distinction for the order of the world of the texts. Nonetheless, it is to be 
emphasized that the law of genre does not only regulate the work, the main 
corpus which gives the genre its name, but almost always to the life/text which 
complicates the questions of reading. Thus, the reader/writer of the genre tends 
to read and write at the same time by censoring his self, not to censor the truth. 
In this sense, to limit the self, self-writing, self-account becomes the very 
condition of telling the truth. Thus, this “dialectics” somehow paradoxically 
defines a personality and impersonality at the same time, but suppresses “the 
other” element which is also a requisite to it: the auto/biographical.  
The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness 
of what one really is, and is “knowing thyself” as a product of 
historical process to date, which has deposited in you an 
infinity of traces without leaving an inventory…therefore it is 
imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory. 
(Gramsci 1971, 323)  
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Whereas Spivak was pointing out the autobiographical character of 
Orientalism, Gramsci relates life and work in the context of criticism by a self-
consciousness formulated as Ancient Greek dictum “Know Thyself”. This 
appropriation of knowing one’s self and of an inventory-trace relationship 
which resembles memory reminds what we call “autobiography”. Actually, in 
an autobiography the writer (the subject) is the subject of a text, and in a 
writing moment, a writing scene, he remembers himself, his self, with the help 
of traces he found from his memory and writes the truth of his life sincerely. At 
the Reader’s Digest level, the question of sincerity is one of the most important 
criteria for the criticism of the autobiography.  
In this manner, Gramsci speaks of an autobiographical a priori 
(“starting point”) for any critical elaboration. Indeed, as it is criticized above, a 
priori is also at work, life is at work in biographical or bio-geo-graphical 
accounts and the representations of intellectuals. Here, one of the more 
elaborated beginning questions appears regarding how life and work relate 
each other in critical reading. First of all, it is to be seen that there is a 
differentiation between biography and autobiography. Whereas the auto 
function, the machinery character in autobiography designates self-reflection, 
self-representation, “self-life-writing,” biography points to an other’s life and 
the other’s representation. Therefore, just like the bio-geo-graphical 
representations and readings of “Oriental” intellectuals, any representation of 
any writer would be biographical. By definition, autobiography is a self-act, a 
self-activivity. Therefore, to be faithful to the law of genre, it should be said 
that any reading operates with a biography, with a text written about the writer 
by the reader himself.  
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Returning to Gramsci’s words, let me remind the autobiographical a 
priori. In what Gramsci enunciates as “a critical elaboration,” biographical and 
autobiographical a priori intermingles. Gramsci leads us to inside (one’s self) 
in the critical elaboration for it is seen evident that criticism is directed to an 
extension, a being, a text outside. At this point, being unfaithful to the law of 
genre, when we question a logic of origin, of a priori we see how the borders 
and limits of the biography and autobiography blur. Not only them, also the 
very question of outside and inside is at stake here. It is elusive how this 
biography is written and how the autobiography of the critic/reader determines, 
affects the reading/critique. 
The problem of sincerity in autobiography is not only putting this 
question in a very naïve way but it is also symptomatic. The meanings of 
making or telling the truth mixes and confuses in the question of 
autobiography: This is nothing but to say there is a truth outside of my inside. 
As the writer of autobiography, I objectify I, and if I am objective enough, my 
autobiography will be sincere and honest. In this sense, I should tell the truth as 
I see rather than make the truth, for making means here manipulating the truth 
out there. Nonetheless, if the truth I search and write is outside, if the truth of 
my self is other than me, then the circularity of auto is broken here and my 
autobiography has something biographical in itself. It means that I write my 
self as an other, and my self is other. Also presented as the problematic of the 
fictional character of autobiography, the distinction between making and telling 
the truth blurs at this point.  
Interestingly, whereas deception and self-deception is the greatest sin, 
confession is not only almost always celebrated for the genre of autobiography 
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but it is also the beginning of the genre traditionally. Briefly insisting on the 
beginning, origin, genesis and what Hegel calls “a priori fictions” (Hegel 1981, 
29) for now, it is to be emphasized that the reader/writer of the text and the 
world is also given by a theological or mythological (always logical, always 
with a certain relation logos) narration of original sin and of a fate of sin. This 
also reveals the theological character of the reading/writing subject for this 
subject acquires a totality and unity be-fore the God.  
The radical difference between human and God, whether it takes a 
form of an acquiescence or opposition, seems to define the subjectivity with a 
sin or lack and requires a confession in any life-story for this is the original 
biography of subjectivity. This is what we can call as both graphical and non-
graphical writing of subjectivity. Subjectivity is written and given to the extent 
that it would not give rein to any other self-writing without its mark. Even in 
the death of God, this subjectivity reigns in one way or another, always with a 
certain reference to a reason and truth, since “what is dead wields a very 
specific power.” (Derrida 1981, 6) 
This given and necessary biography of humanity would go hand in 
hand in any autobiography of a proper name and turn into a story of personal 
and impersonal sins and confessions eventually. No need to say that being the 
originary and exemplar work, Confessions of Saint Augustine would be an 
inevitable model and help to constitute the law of genre. As Derrida puts it 
forward quite clearly, any writing would begin with a pledge, a promise:  
In place of a constative description, you would then hear a 
promise, an oath; you would grasp the following respectful 
commitment: I promise you that I will not mix genres, and, 
through this act of pledging utter faithfulness to my 
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commitment, I will be faithful to the law of genre, since, by 
its very nature, the law invites and commits me in advance 
not to mix genres. (Derrida and Ronell 1980, 57)    
 
Derrida calls this “cryptopolitics,” through which he designates how 
intellectuals, academicians and even priests control the writing as an 
ideological apparatus (Derrida 1979). Within the elliptical approach of this 
study, this cryptopolitics, as a beginning where my writing begins in an 
external provocation and in an internal response at the same time, will be taken 
into account again and again, as it is anticipated, with Derrida’s concepts of 
signature and proper name. Before any dissemination offered in an oblique 
manner in which italics and the sign (/) is at work all the time, it is to be 
admitted that not only the concepts, but also Derrida’s signature and proper 
name is always at work. Though I tried to refer spectrality several times in this 
sense, let me also underline the transferential character of this writing in which 
I do not only follow or imitate but watch some haunting ghosts. 
Representation is death. Which may be immediately transformed into 
the following proposition: death is (only) representation. But it is 
bound to life and to the living present which it repeats originarily. A 
pure representation, a machine, never runs by itself. (Derrida 2001, 
227) 
 
Therefore, also keeping in mind the cryptopolitics, let me recall 
myself and confess before you how I several times felt as if there are some 
ghosts inside the classroom. Like in a Woody Allen movie, some ghosts 
haunted me when the professor was talking and talking. In the safe and sound 
environment of the classroom, I, my self, was attacked by the words of 
professor and I began to see ghosts wandering around, between the desks, in 
front of the blackboard and near me: just to name the two, the holy ghosts of 
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Edward Said and Jacques Derrida were sometimes walking around the 
classroom.  
Writing is unthinkable without repression. The condition for 
writing is that there be neither a permanent contact nor an 
absolute break between strata: the vigilance and failure of 
censorship. It is no accident that the metaphor of censorship 
should come from the area of politics concerned with the 
deletions, blanks, and disguises of writing, even if, at the 
beginning of the Traumdeutung, Freud seems to make only a 
conventional, didactic reference to it. The apparent exteriority 
of political censorship refers to an essential censorship which 
binds the writer to his own writing. (Derrida 2001, 285) 
 
At this point, let me send you to Derrida: resembling Freud’s 
transferential neurosis, wherein the analyst tries to make the analysand to re-
experience the forgotten memory and the analysand displaces onto the analyst 
feeling connected to someone in the analysand’s past, for Derrida, every 
philosophical text has its transferential figures. “There is always someone else, 
you know. The most private autobiography comes to terms with great 
transferential figures, who are themselves and themselves plus someone else.” 
(Derrida 1995, 353) One of these transferential figures, as we mentioned 
before, Nietzsche said “I do not believe that a ‘drive to knowledge’ is the father 
of philosophy.”(Nietzsche 2003, 37) Father. Could there be the mother of 
philosophy? Derrida would reply:  
My mother could not be a philosopher. The philosopher 
could not be my mother. That’s a very important point. 
Because the figure of philosopher is, for me, always a 
masculine figure. This is one of the reasons why I undertook 
the deconstruction of philosophy. All the deconstruction of 
phallogocentrism is the deconstruction of what one calls 
philosophy, which since its inception has always been linked 
to a paternal figure. So a philosopher is a father, not a mother. 
(Dick and Kofman 2002)  
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When Derrida is asked what he would like to know about the personal 
lives of some philosophers like Heidegger or Husserl, Derrida responds it by 
asking a series of questions, also directing us to the cryptopolitics of 
philosophy: “Why do these philosophers present themselves asexually in their 
work? Why have they erased their private life from their work? Or never talked 
about anything personal?” (Dick and Kofman 2002) The promise of this 
chapter stated above is to take into account some resistance in the philosophy, 
or more precisely, some resistance in the “project of pure reason” of some 
philosophies to the auto/biography.  
Impersonal and a-sexual, non-gendered philosophy assuming itself 
mother-less, apart from the living feminine, (Derrida 1988) also excludes 
women in philosophy. Jacques Derrida and Avital Ronell discuss this problem 
in their The Law of Genre referring “a biological genre in the sense of gender, 
or the human genre, a genre of all that is in general.” (Derrida and Ronell 1980, 
56) The project of pure reason would also exclude sexual difference in its 
purity. For that matter, for the other matters, I feel somewhat obliged to admit 
that a list of the signatures, the proper names, or any other possible list which 
can be arranged in this study, almost always share some masculinity.  
This symptom of philosophy which this study cannot avoid displays 
how this writing itself is poisoned and it uses the sources, the origins it tries to 
escape. Just to respond this internal/external problem of this study, it is a 
responsibility at least to have a recourse one of my chances: Insisting on le 
parler femme (womanspeak) and écriture féminine (gendered women's 
writing), Luce Irigaray herself extends this problem to language and states: 
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“Now generally language –in any case in the West- is a code elaborated taking 
into account masculine subjectivity. The linguistic code is not really neutral.” 
(Irigaray 2002, 79)   
The project of pure reason, then, posits a philosophical figure 
who/which is a) western –as it is described in the introduction to a certain 
extent, b) a demigod that is non-auto-biographical in the writing of philosophy, 
and c) a male as it is anticipated in its deity. Though this is not a finished and 
complete description, for the project itself is inherently poisoned by these 
forces in itself, the discourse followed in this study hopefully allows one to 
draw not a consequence but a sketch of this figure as such. All these figural 
accounts of the philosopher would send us to the ends of philosophy which 
presents itself explicitly in Kant when it takes the name of “pure reason.” 
However, the project itself will be first exemplified here in Hegel’s dictum for 
its purity:  
The sole aim of philosophical enquiry is to eliminate the 
contingent. Contingency is the same as external necessity, 
that is, a necessity which originates in causes which are 
themselves no more than external circumstances. (Hegel 
1981, 28) 
 
Hegel’s dictum sheds a light on both the definition of philosophy and 
the question of externality and internality. As one of the most important binary 
oppositions of Western metaphysics, the “inside/outside” polarity determined 
and guarded by fixed, stable and decisive limits and boundaries has the 
function of defining philosophy. The reason behind the elimination of the 
contingent is nothing but defining philosophy. With a so-called self-evident 
reference to externality/internality, Hegel tries to define philosophy by 
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excluding the contingent in a philosophy in the service of the project of pure 
reason. Nevertheless, Derrida would be suspicious not only about such a 
definition of philosophy but also about this clear cut differentiation of 
internality and externality: 
The "dialectics" of the same and the other, of outside and 
inside, of the homogeneous and heterogeneous, are, as you 
know, among the most contorted ones. The outside can always 
become again an "object" in the polarity subject/object, or the 
reassuring reality of what is outside the text; and there is 
sometimes an "inside" that is as troubling as the outside may 
be reassuring. This is not to be overlooked in the critique of 
interiority and subjectivity. (Derrida 1981, 67) 
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Chapter 3 - The ‘Work’ of Pure Reason 
Originally a phrase by Robert Smith, the work or project of pure 
reason has been implicitly mentioned with the references of Richard Rorty. 
With the intervention of Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty, let me underline 
what shall and should be done with the work of pure reason in this study: As 
Jason Powell, the biographer of Jacques Derrida declares, this study tries to 
share a dream in a deconstructive way:  
We could point to a residual trait which is in fact definitive of 
Derrida's type of reading/criticism, namely that he does not find fault 
by arguing against or along with the text he reads, but goes for the 
whole 'world-disclosive' picture set forth in the text, enjoying its 
poetic power as it were, and taking for granted that it is neither right 
nor wrong, only then to show that by its own standards and its own 
argumentation it cannot work and become a coherent textual artifact. 
(Powell 2006, 44) 
Derrida shows us that the truth about a text is protected by an interior 
space as it is seen in the ideas of the structure and unity of the book. Alongside 
that interior space, this truth is also constituted by an extra-linguistic space 
which is complicated with some references to a constructed place of critical 
privilege such as the author, his or her biography, the reader or the world, a 
world as it is read by ignoring the contradiction of system of event. 
Paradoxically then, “outside” the text is not an exteriority which disperses the 
meaning of texts, but an interiority which in turn constitutes and protects the 
truth. 
But pure perception does not exist: we are written only as we write, by 
the agency within us which always already keeps watch over 
perception, be it internal or external. The “subject” of writing does not 
exist if we mean by that some sovereign solitude of the author. The 
subject of writing is a system of relations between strata: the Mystic 
Pad, the psyche, society, the world. Within that scene, on that stage, 
the punctual simplicity of the classical subject is not to be found. 
(Derrida 2001, 226) 
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What I tried to describe here so far, with a  reference to the question of 
life-work, I hope, displays that Derrida does not only insist on the linguistic 
dimensions of the text, for example, when he refers to play, chance, singularity 
or when he says “there’s nothing outside the text”. The generalized conception 
of text which also deconstructs the limits and borderlines of life and text is not 
a transcendental standpoint that denies the world and history in favor of what 
Foucault says “a vast sea of signification.” 
The concept of appropriation here can be defined at the intersection of 
the text-appropriating and the world-appropriating acts. Nevertheless, making 
things one’s own, appropriating the books, texts, names, signatures, does not 
only read and write the world in the book and the book in the world. One 
should also consider the life of the text’, ‘the life in the text’ as well as the 
world of texts. The auto/biographical, in this sense, is a text in a way which is 
conceptually generalized by Derrida, a life/text living and dying in the text. 
*** 
Reminding the auto/biographical accounts of Oriental intellectuals, 
and the cryptopolitics in general which is at work in pedagogical and academic 
institutions, Hegel on the one hand acknowledges the contingency (the 
auto/biographical, in one sense) as an external necessity, but on the other, he 
defines the sole aim of philosophical enquiry as to eliminate it. The words of 
Hegel display how philosophy is poisoned by itself, by a pharmakon which is 
both cure and the source of risk for it is both necessity and non-origin. For 
Hegel, the origin is not and cannot be the contingent for it is no more than a 
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consequence of external circumstances. Nevertheless, the same Hegel refers to 
self-consciousness as an origin, just like Gramsci.  
Hegel insists on the necessity of subjective ‘moments’ -such 
as self-consciousness- on the way to reason, on the way to 
absolute knowledge, that is, any universal or absolute which 
attempts to do away with such moments will be unfounded. 
(Smith 1995, 4)  
Actually, it is to be emphasized that he is not the same Hegel, since it 
is the same proper name but it is an other signature of him, a signature which 
originates within the dynamic border of life/work. At this borderline where the 
end of philosophy is to reach a universal which is only possible through a 
“pure” reason, the demigod figure of philosopher falls to the world that is 
bounded with “external circumstances.” Then, it became gradually clear that 
this universal and pure philosopher can neither be non-western nor feminine, 
since it presupposes a unity of subjectivity. Indeed, what we learn from 
“theory” which is at work in the cultural and literary studies is that the 
“universal subject” who is seemingly neutral is white, male, western and 
heterosexual implicitly. As it is seen in the Cambridge Affair this philosophy 
would define these studies themselves outside the borders of philosophy. And  
it defines an idea of canonicity which celebrates the best silently by virtue of 
this ideal neutrality.  
The ideal thus seems to reduce the human species to only one 
gender furthermore to an individual that would become 
neutral with regard to sexual identity. What is removed, what 
is denied is difference itself, difference between two genders. 
(Irigaray 2002, 79) 
 
As it is implied above, the other would only be accepted to the degree 
of his commitment and engagement to a self-acclaimed universality, and with a 
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condition of inclusion/exclusion in his representational biography. Turning 
back to femininity again, Luce Irigaray would define “the universal for the 
woman is therefore reduced to a practical labor included within the horizon of 
the universal defined by the man.” (Irigaray 1991, 169) Within this horizon a) 
the figure of philosopher as a writer/performer, b) the borderline of life and 
work in the writing of philosophy, and c) the cryptopolitics delimiting and 
regulating the realms of academic study closes itself to the other implicitly. 
Free-willing others may achieve becoming a universal subject only by 
registering their selves to the idea of great canonicity and to the ideal neutrality.  
Accordingly, it is not surprising to find a counter-resistance in 
cultural, literary, post-colonial and gender studies which transgress the borders, 
and try to find a room to auto/biography in “theory.” Though the new 
meaning(s) and place of the word “theory” is apparently in need of further 
reflection, let me confine myself to point out that it is somewhat a necessary 
substitution for philosophical thinking in these fields of study. Reminding 
Cambridge Affair, it should be emphasized again some proper names seem to 
be more ready for any cooperation with what is called theory.  
It is to be emphasized here, there is a certain counter-resistance, 
critique or deconstruction towards the project of pure reason: I hope that one 
can sense the ghosts of not only Spivak, Nietzsche and Derrida, but also of 
Marx, Freud, Levinas, Foucault, and so on, in this study. These proper names 
do not constitute a list of familial connections as a means of justification, since 
I find it both unnecessary and reductive. I should cautiously remind how sur-
names such as “postmodern,” “post-modernity,” “post-modernism” or “post-
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structuralism” reduces the works of these names and ignores the singularity 
demanded for each.  
The notion of philosophical legitimacy fuses with that of 
historical legitimacy, both understood mere in terms of 
belonging or non-belonging to a tradition, heritage, 
genealogy or legacy than in terms of an abstract propriety.  
(Smith 1995, 33) 
 
Reminding philosophy/thinking/theory or the other way around, 
Spanish writer and philosopher Miguel de Unamuno criticizes the idea of 
movements, streams or trends in philosophy and directs us to what we 
described as the compartmental approach to life/work in the education of 
philosophy: “In most of the histories of philosophy that I know, philosophic 
systems are presented to us as if growing out of one another spontaneously, and 
their authors, the philosophers, appear only as mere pretexts. The inner 
biography of the philosophers, of the men who philosophized, occupies only a 
secondary place. And yet it is precisely this inner biography that explains for us 
most things.” (Unamuno 1954, 2) Just from the beginnings of this study, 
putting this question of secondary-ness forward, we tried to call these “most 
things” which requires a further understanding. Although this call is even 
traced back to the Ancient Greek origins of philosophy, the reason (and the 
chance) behind a continuous reference to Derrida is that, reminding Nietzsche, 
he transforms this call to a response, to a responsibility.  
Indeed, one can hear this call or acceptance from many other 
philosophers which turns out to be just “an avoidance that states the obvious 
but leaving it untouched.” (Smith 1995, 6) One of the other citations I would 
like to make also shows how this “duty” or call is responded by a deferral; a 
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sending to future like it is seen in the words of Jung above. However one may 
find some reasonable excuses for Jung, it is interesting that philosophers 
themselves avoid this problem implicitly. One can easily see this deferral in the 
words of Schiller: “Philosophy, then, will have the duty of tracing out the 
consequences of personality in all our knowing, because science will not do 
so.” (Von Schiller 1939, 39) Here, Schiller defines a duty which is shared by 
philosophy and science, but credits and privileges philosophy within a logic of 
dichotomy. It is also interesting to see that how he defers this “duty of tracing” 
with a will and posits this duty as a certain necessity that seems almost 
conditioned with the fate/faith that science will not realize this duty.  
According to Robert Smith, these effects of the project of pure reason 
are at work just from the beginning of the threat of Sophists, that is, since the 
Ancient Greek origins of philosophy. Since philosophy has an irreducibly 
moralistic or ideological origin in its constitution for the good of public, the 
rhetorics as an art pose a risk in the hands of Sophistry. Also explaining the 
obsession of methodology in modern philosophy, Smith argues that “modernity 
always has been the property of philosophy for as long as being a science has 
shaped its ambition.” (Smith 1995, 15) The emphasis of Schiller about the 
science appears here again: as long as philosophy is formed scientifically with 
its direct recourse to methodology, it would not be appropriate for undertaking 
that duty. More interestingly, Smith stresses the moralistic constitution of 
philosophy and combines it with the legislative force acquired by a certain 
recourse to methodology.  
In this manner, Hegel’s sole aim of “eliminating the contingent is 
probably the most general, the most basic method of method.” (Smith 1995, 
37 
  
16) With its anti-Sophist origins, this contingent would include the literary and 
rhetorical aspects of the texts philosophy and in some examples it would 
reduce philosophy itself to a pure logic. The legislative force, the generic law 
of philosophy is enforced accordingly and it draws the limits of philosophy as 
well as authorizes the figure of philosopher with the right to police the safe 
area of knowledge. This double logic of science and legislation has two duties 
to eliminate the contingency: first of all it will clean the area of phenomena 
from the contingency, and then it will clean itself from contingency.  
In this double logic, there is no place for the duty stated by Schiller, 
for it has to be deferred and deferred for the survival of the universality. Yet, 
where the pure reason of philosophy is most powerful, the question of 
auto/biography pops up whether in the form of confession or self-
consciousness. Smith asks here: “Why, if the contingent is contingent, does it 
need to be eliminated? Does it not disqualify itself automatically?” (Smith 
1995, 19) The answer is no, because it is the very condition of philosophy.  
Also interfering Smith’s statements about Ancient Greek origins of 
philosophy, let me quote Michael Frede to show how these origins themselves 
include what is defined as contingency: desire, belief, chance and all the other 
elements of impurity which are assumed too personal, too subjective and too 
superficial for the philosophical enquiry. Frede speaks about “two crucial 
features which the notions of reason as conceived of by Socrates, Plato, 
Aristotle, or the Stoics, all share.”(Frede 2002, 5)  
First, it is part of the notion of reason according to these 
philosophers that reason has its own needs and desires…The 
assumption is that at least some desires, like the desire to 
know the truth or to obtain what is thought of as good, are 
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desires of reason itself, rather than desires reason merely 
endorses. (Frede 2002, 5-6) 
In this path, Frede criticizes the modern over-simplification of reason 
which reduces reason to a mere calculative faculty or an ability to process data 
which should be neutral by its nature and origin. As it is seen in the first 
feature, reason has a desiderative or voluntative aspect in its Ancient Greek 
origins. This desiderative aspect, however, is excluded in modern thought and 
reason has become to seen just as a cognitive function. Accordingly, the aim of 
the cognitive reason becomes to reach a perfect method and to determine the 
first rules as it is seen in the Rules for the Direction of Mind of Descartes. 
Pointing out the later emergence of the notion of will with Cicero, Frede 
designates how the connection between desire and subjective reason is broken. 
In this manner, as the subject of pure reason directs the mind to close 
itself to the subjectivity, it presupposes a subject who acquires the privilege of 
knowing the object. This privilege requires the sacrifice of human experience 
which in turn reduced to the cognition of things. Reminding pharmakon, a new 
subjectivity is born against itself, minimizing its subjectivity, for the sake of its 
mastery over objects and of objectivity. In these critiques (of Descartes, of 
Hegel or Kant) -which refers to Ancient Greek word crisis, to delimit, to 
separate and to divide- the subject of cognition should clean itself from itself 
by a methodology, by eliminating the contingency. In Signéponge, as a “non-
synonymous supplement,” Derrida refers to the sponge, to the science sponge 
which gets inevitably dirty and impure in its duty of wiping clean. (Derrida 
1984) Thus, such a cleanliness-dirtiness, purity-impurity becomes not only the 
precondition of things, but also of the scientific, methodological project of 
“pure” reason itself.   
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Thus, one can see how, under the influence of Christianity, a 
notion of reason would tend not to be characterized by the 
two distinctive features of earlier Greek notions of reason: 
reason would not be constituted at least in part by knowledge 
about the world, and it would not have desires of its own, its 
desiderative aspect being absorbed into a doctrine of 
will.(Frede 2002, 26)   
Regarding the doctrine of will, then, there are two attitudes separated 
with a clear-cut certainty in subjectivity: By the differential critique of “I 
desire” and “I know,” the source of knowledge has come to be defined with its 
difference from desire. It is the very condition of cognition as a necessity. 
Referring his experience of writing, Derrida would interfere here and claim an 
absolute war between his desire and Necessity: 
I write against my desire. I know very well that between my 
desire and necessity -what I call Necessity with a capital N in 
La Carte Postale, like a character- between my desire and 
Necessity, and those necessities which dictate to me what I 
write, there is an absolute war. (Smith 1995, 10)   
As it is seen in “the work pure reason,” the necessity of an 
elimination, methodology, critique and so on should oppose desire and 
overcome it necessarily. At first sight, Necessity is to be interpreted as the 
character who/which posits some necessities depicted above, which dictates 
one what to and not to write. Since it is like a character, Necessity refers to a 
philosophical figure and points out the performative aspect of writing in 
general and writing philosophy. Why and how, then, does Derrida claim that he 
writes against his desire? In another text, however, Derrida reverses his side in 
the war and states that he also wages a war on the other side: “I would oppose 
desire to necessity, to Ananke.”(Derrida 1988, 115) Starting with the basic 
necessities of life, ruling compulsion, constraint, and restraint, Ananke is the 
deity in Ancient Greek Mythology.  
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Pointing out the war between desire and necessity at first, what 
Derrida does is to make the philosophy also a site of desire. For Derrida, 
however, the Necessity with a capital N, is neither the internal necessity of the 
work of pure reason nor the external necessity of Hegel. Since, the necessity of 
methodology requiring an elimination of the contingent and the realm of desire 
in reason, it necessarily behaves as if it finds its righteous conditions of 
necessity to detect and capture the contingency. Nevertheless, since desire is 
disseminated in the text of philosophy’s everywhere and nowhere in its 
spectrality, Necessity with a capital N itself also becomes an unconditional 
figure of something more necessary for its incalculability. “Necessity comes, 
not to say No to desire, but to explain to desire that its condition of 
impossibility is also condition of its possibility.” For Derrida, to write against 
desire is also to write against philosophy’s systemic mastery, since Derrida’s 
Necessity directs him to respond to the other in its unpredictability.   
You are the only one to understand why it really was 
necessary that I write exactly the opposite, as concerns 
axiomatic, of what I desire, what I know my desire to be, in 
other words you: living speech, presence itself, proximity, the 
proper, the guard, etc. I have necessarily written on the other 
side - and in order to surrender Necessity.(Smith 1995, 11)  
Turning back to intervention beginning with Frede, what Derrida 
makes is to claim that when I write “I” both desire and know. This is nothing 
but to affirm that there are no sides in this serious game in which neither desire 
nor Necessity is reducible. “I try to articulate the Necessity which urges me, 
compels me to write and to teach what I write, and this articulation means that 
it is because there is no pure presence that I desire it.(Derrida 2004)” And this 
is not true only for Derrida’s writing, but also for other philosophers’ texts, 
since it is impossible to be out of textuality, to remind the infamous motto: 
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And as you very well know, when I said ‘there is nothing out 
of the text’ I did not mean the text in the sense of what is 
written in a book; I first generalized the concept of text, of 
trace -‘text’ is not just, say literature or philosophy but life in 
general. Life after theory is a text.(Derrida 2004, 27)  
Since all the divisions and borders which we assign in-to a text are 
always already overrun by the textuality itself, there is something what a writer 
desires or intends to control and something which cannot be controlled by him. 
In this sense, the absolute war between Necessity and desire cannot be taken up 
by any general law whether it is the law of genre or the project of pure reason 
articulated by any type of philosophy. All these are produced from some other 
locations inside and outside the text/game, for the text “is always a differential 
network, a fabric or traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to 
other differential traces.” (Derrida 1987, 84) Derrida’s work begins with a 
response to a call mentioned above, a responsibility to “some others who have 
no identity in this cultural scene.”(Derrida 1995, 352)  
As the life/work and the auto/biographical concerned, there is some 
other place in the philosophical text, some place in the other text and there is an 
other of the philosophical text. Before the response of Jacques Derrida which 
shall be discussed later, let us briefly talk about the return of the original/other 
desire, remembering Frede. Indeed, this return would not be a moment of 
auto/biographical writing in philosophy, for there is no one moment, an 
absolute beginning and an end of writing. For that matter, it will be rather an 
invasion of philosophy by it as a whole, because this is the return of the ghost, 
of the dead which is killed by the project of pure reason, but which is still alive 
in philosophy in its spectrality: “Spectrality is 'anachronistic'. The time -or, 
more correctly times- of the spectre is always already multiple. Spectrality thus 
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disrupts all conventional notions of time and presence/absence.”(Wolfreys 
1998, 30) 
In his Spectres of Marx, Derrida defines a work of mourning which is 
not simply a work among others, but a “work itself.”(Derrida 1994, 97) As 
referred in the title of this chapter, if there is a “work of pure reason” as a 
sacrifice, a self-sacrifice, a self-attack, even a self-poisoning for the sake of 
purity in a paradoxically double logic, the work of mourning would also a 
involve a double logic of remembering and forgetting. The spectral logic, 
however, requires this response to be made without a detour, for the spectre is 
not an a priori existent which has been dead but it is also a spirit of the other 
yet to come. The spectre is not a person, since it is already dead and always 
alive, and its return would therefore be unanticipatable and unpredictable.   
For that reason, Hegel’s or Gramsci’s self-consciousness, Kant’s 
transcendental illusion, or Schiller’s deferral cannot be a response, since they 
still have to presuppose the auto/biographical as a part of their critical 
subjectivity. Conditioned with a relation of part-whole, and a logic of purity-
impurity, the idea of the subject of pure reason assimilated and incorporated in 
the universal can neither mourn nor welcome its other responsibly. These so-
called efforts, then, are nothing but to capture and tame the auto/biographical. 
Such a ghost-busting, in any sense, is impossible for the ghost haunting is 
evasive and non-educable inevitably. Let me quote here the lyrics of the song 
appeared in the movie Ghost Busters (Reitman 1984), which can summarize 
these accounts as well as give me/us the pleasure of impurity. 
If there's something strange 
in your neighborhood 
Who ya gonna call? 
GHOSTBUSTERS 
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If there's something weird 
and it don't look good 
Who ya gonna call? 
GHOSTBUSTERS 
 
If you're seeing things 
running through your head 
Who can ya call? 
GHOSTBUSTERS 
 
An invisible man 
sleeping in your bed 
Who ya gonna call? 
GHOSTBUSTERS  
Yet, in his philosophical tribute to Jacques Derrida, which turns out to 
be a fabulous (fabulosus, fabula, fable) interpretation for me, Alain Badiou 
states that: “Derrida is the opposite of a hunter. A hunter hopes that the animal 
will stop, so that he can shoot. Or so that he can mow down the animal’s 
flight.” (Badiou 2009, 134) Since, the hunter, the logic is hunting the capture 
and take benefit of the animal, he takes a distance to the animal, waits for the 
right time, and follows it. There are at least two conditions, then: first, as 
Badiou states a stop, a cease in the machine-like action of the animal, and the 
distance. Derrida, however, with no intention to shoot, tries to get as close as 
possible to locate, much closer for a shot.    
From the spectre’s haunting to the animal’s machine-like flight, the 
subject of pure reason is a hunter, a hunter of the other. Whether it is a non-
present spectre within/out the text, or the original other within/out the 
nature/culture, the hunting of other begins with a distance: that is a hunting qua 
naming. Since the subject of pure reason is almost always constituted between 
the animal and god, the animal is the radical other: worldly and cultural man 
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hunts the natural animal, from a distance kept by naming at first. This is the 
violence of naming/hunting the other, for the sake of the constitution of the 
subject of pure reason. For the subject “I” acquires the necessary totality in its 
name, the auto/biographical animal has to name the other. This hunting qua 
naming does not aim the well-being of the human, but it is also the very 
condition of being of the subject of pure reason.  
No text can defend itself without the other first coming to its 
aid. No text has the necessary solidity, coherence, assurance 
and systematicity if the response of the other does not come 
and interrupt it, and by interrupting it, make it 
resonate.(Smith 1995, 115)  
In accordance with the “command” of God, the animal other should 
be sacrificed, for the man who gave the animals their names has right and 
necessity to do that. From so long now, we sacrifice the animals to the God for 
our salvation. Today, as Derrida points out, in a critical phase of tele-techno-
scientific age, for the sake of Homo Sacer, for the good and interest of man, for 
the well-being of human, that is naming animal we are sacrificing animals “at a 
demographic level unknown in the past.” (Derrida 2002, 394) Naming animal 
names the animal(s) with a vast concept of animality and sacrifices them for 
the sake of its salvation and/or well-being in the earth: it expels the animals 
from its ‘world,’ and “does not recognize them as his fellows, his neighbors, or 
brothers.” (Derrida 2002, 402)  The unquestionable right of  sacrificial hunting 
begins with the difference between naming animal and the named animal other. 
In this sense, for Benjamin, the nature’s sadness or mourning does not result 
from its muteness, but in the first place the fact of receiving one’s name. 
(Derrida 2002, 389)  
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“Being called, hearing oneself being named, receiving a 
name for the first time involves something like the 
knowledge of being mortal and even the feeling that one is 
dying. Already dead by virtue of being promised to death: 
dying.”(Derrida 2002, 389) 
 
Accordingly, the name of the other registered by “I” is always the 
limit of my name, my desire to escape from death. Naming the other as a self-
naming, I say “I” to the other before calling her name: I name, therefore I am. 
With the name of the other, I also define my “self”. This is the condition of my 
ability to call my self; just after the call of the other, I can say “I”. I separate 
my self, my body, from the other with a membrane which is called name. 
Nonetheless, the boundary enabling me to become one also limits the other and 
surrounds and hunts her with another “name”. Within the muddy world of the 
signified, she can only gain a presence with the name given to her. A name 
gives her a presence, and makes her present-at-hand, ready for any use, techné 
and/or violence. The operation of naming, disabling her to name her self or 
resisting her to call her self as “I”, like the animal other, is nothing but the 
violence of naming the other.  
As Derrida experiences in the face of his pussycat, however, the 
bottomless gaze of the other when the “I” is nude, when I am non-dressed by 
names which are auto-referential by virtue of techniques, the shame arises and 
bites my tongue. The shame from the violent difference and at the same time, 
the shame from the sameness prevents my word temporally in the face of other, 
until I find a new technique to cover, dress this gap. Yet, the name by virtue of 
which she is present, hunted, dead and then ghost, somehow remains 
inaccessible and closed to my tongue. In this manner, “the other, as the other 
than self, the other that opposes self-identity, is not something that can be 
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detected and disclosed within a philosophical space and with the aid of a 
philosophical lamp.”(Smith 1995, 108)  
Thus, to continue this study’s discourse on the ‘work’ of pure reason, 
let me propose that philosophy’s lamp is blind, philosophy’s eye is blind, 
philosophy’s I is blind. Like the eye, it is blind to itself, it cannot see itself. But 
also it is blind to the other, to its others and to the others in textuality. Indeed, 
one can offer that one of the essential foundations of our philosophical thinking 
depends on the act of seeing, noting the words, terms and/or concept/metaphors 
like: lethe-aletheia, theoria, enlightenment, perspective, world-view, illusion, 
evident, evidence, obvious, witness, revealing, revelation, concealing, 
concealment, appearance, apparent, exposition, exposedness, and so on. Thus, 
this is not a question of visual perception, for the act of seeing is not taken here 
as a faculty, or as a “pure” act that can be conceptualized evidently, but as a 
theme that can be traced textually.  
But pure perception does not exist: we are written only as we 
write, by the agency within us which always already keeps 
watch over perception, be it internal or external. The 
“subject” of writing does not exist if we mean by that some 
sovereign solitude of the author. The subject of writing is a 
system of relations between strata: the Mystic Pad, the 
psyche, society, the world. Within that scene, on that stage, 
the punctual simplicity of the classical subject is not to be 
found.(Derrida 2001, 285) 
 
Let me carry on, then, my discourse from name and naming to eye, 
seeing, light and, blindness. The eye (I) can see the things, the world, the 
others, but cannot see itself. The eye is only seen by the others, by another eye 
(I). Unable to see itself as an ob-ject, the I (eye) seem to announce its subject-
ness and risks to see the other I (eye). This leads some problems regarding the 
seeing the other I (eye) such as thinking/considering/regarding the other I (eye) 
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as an object. Attributing itself the monopole authority of seeing and reifying 
both itself and the other, the eye (I) claims to see the other. This illusion of 
continuity and subject-ness of Dasein in the act of seeing does result from the 
history of the eye that constitutes the “logic” of seeing by enframing. This logic 
also is the guardian of continuity of identity, seeing-I (eye) and its grandiose 
location in the world. Then, one can interpret Cogito, “I think” as “I see”: “I 
am the same, I think continuously and I see continuously.” The things and the 
world may change, their appearances may flow but my eyes always already 
catch and grasp them in my-self. 
In this way of seeing/thinking the other, the other I (eye) is bound to 
remain eye(I)-less and gaze-less. The gaze-less other becomes an object 
colonized by the eye. As to personal other (l’autrui), a phantasm of seeing the 
gaze would create an illusion of seeing for the eye (I). Yet, a gaze cannot be 
seen, but only imagined; eye can only see the eye. Not being able to see itself, 
its phantasm, the I (eye) imagines that it can see the other through seeing his 
gaze-eye. Nonetheless, both a reifying, objectifying gaze toward the other and 
a phantasm of seeing the other’s gaze would mean as not accepting the other-
ness of other. A seeing/thinking that locates the distinction between the visible 
and invisible in favor of the seer-subject would not be able to see the other, but 
sentence it to the darkness. 
***** 
To conclude this discourse of the ‘work’ of pure reason, let me remind 
the reader the paths we followed in this dark forest. For the sake of eliminating 
the contingency (Hegel), philosophy would exclude desiderative aspects of 
reason and make the reason purer and purer by reducing it to a mere calculative 
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faculty (Frede). However, unable to resist what we call ‘auto/biographical’ 
which it tries to desist (Derrida), the same/other philosophers try to find a way 
to include it referring to a self, to a consciousness and to a self-consciousness 
(Gramsci, Hegel). These efforts to bust, grasp and capture the 
‘auto/biographical’ in a closed subjectivity are almost always deferred to a 
future (Unamuno, Schiller). Since, the autobiographical a) is a pharmakon 
which is both poison and remedy, a) is a spectrality which cannot be regulated 
by a general law, and c) it always makes the methodological sponge of 
elimination impure and dirty.  
All these operations to include auto/biographical would be inadequate 
in advance, for the very logic of pure reason cannot escape its traditional 
customs such as a) violence of naming, and b) the world-disclosive act of 
seeing. In this path, whenever the project of pure reason tries to include the 
other and its other, i.e. the auto/biographical (literary, rhetorical, metaphorical 
and so on), it results as to hunt, to sacrifice and to suppress it. Since the project 
of pure reason tries to keep safe its pure and perfect subjectivity desperately, 
the efforts to capture the auto/biographical, the other and the outside come to 
imprison it again in this presupposed subjectivity. For that reason, philosophy 
is blind, it is blind to the other, and blind to itself in an inevitable circularity.  
Positing an eye (I), a subject of naming and seeing, a subject of 
enframing, philosophy also presupposes a source of light which appears to be 
Logos, God, Reason, and so on. Taking this source from outside, from God, 
from the Eternal Light, or Enlightenment, the seer-subject of pure reason seems 
to consider himself as an “all-seeing eye” ordering and regulating in the world 
(inside). All this results as forgetting the worldliness of the eye (I), the history 
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and the invented logic of seeing/naming. There is no room here for the desire, 
for the contingent, for the dark other, and for the shadowy and spectral 
auto/biography.  
Yet, just nearby the borders of the next chapter in which there is a 
light of hope, I would like to remind a Turkish idiom: “gözün feri-ışığı” which 
means the light of the eye. Connoting the force, the energeia and most 
importantly, the life, the light of the eye referring an internal light granting eye 
an act of seeing. Unlike the external sources of light such as Sun/God, the light 
of the eye is only possible with life. In its Turkish implications, the light of the 
eye does not grant one the ability of seeing, but an act of seeing which 
transcends the opposition of light-dark: life. In this sense, the light of the eye is 
always shared by the other, even by the animal other. This is the 
acknowledgement of life which is shared by all. But death is also shared, for 
when the light of the eye is gone, it means the one has left the life to death: the 
life-death.  
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Chapter 4 - Conclusion: the Auto/biographical 
To use a word such as auto/biographical may only be justifiable at this 
point, at the vanishing point of this study. As it is repeated several times, the 
focus of this study was to raise the question of life/work in writing “theory” 
and philosophy. After referring cryptopolitical investment to the differentiation 
between life and work, and questioning the borderlines and limits between 
them, an oblique mark is a common strategy to point the blurring borders. This 
is also applied to auto/biography for its fictional, mythological and given 
character, which makes problematic to distinguish representation and self-
representation in traditional examples of the genre of autobiography. 
Moreover, apart from most of the other scholars who raised this 
question such as Robert Smith or Joseph Kronick, I preferred to leave the name 
of the genre autobiography and to use the word “auto/biographical” to indicate 
the spectral and the other character of the elements of life in the philosophical 
work. It was also important to emphasize that philosophy is a writing, and 
philosopher is a writer. In this manner, the philosopher and philosophical text 
are bound to general rules of textuality, as defined by Jacques Derrida: such as 
the law of genre, signatures, proper names, the unity of book, performative 
character of philosopher, cryptopolitics, spectrality and so on. 
In this fashion, we can speak of autobiography as a body of 
writing and as an event or engagement wherein the self, 
which does not exist, is given by writing.(Kronick 2000, 999) 
According to my interpretation of Derrida’s work, all these gestures 
were necessary for there is always the risk of colonizing the auto/biographical 
as it is seen in the examples above. The reason beyond this was the general use 
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of autobiography as something synonymous to a self-representative 
subjectivity. As the name of the genre indicates, in the traditional 
autobiographies, a representation of the self in its totality and self-identity was 
almost always given. “The sense of autobiography employed here needs to be 
set against that which promises the constitution of the subject as self-present 
being.” (Kronick 2000, 998)  
Nevertheless, the auto/biographical is a writing which is not a mere 
graphical operation, not only a body of writing, but also a practice. This 
practice is uncontrollable for it is ghostly constitutive in any moment, revealing 
and concealing at the same time. In any case, unlike the self-identity claim of 
the autobiographical subject, the auto/biographical refers to a counter-
resistance to the subject as a self-present being. For that reason, unlike any 
account regarding the subjectivity, it is impossible to capture the 
auto/biographical for it cannot be marked with a letter. The auto/biographical is 
dispersed throughout the text; more precisely it is dispersed outside/inside the 
text. And it takes its power from its non-existence, from its (dis)appearance like 
a ghost.  
I would like to explain this non-existence with the help of Alain 
Badiou’s fabulous interpretation of Derrida, as declared above. Let me begin 
with Badiou’s quotation from Internationale: “We are nothing, let us be all!” 
In his interpretation of this word, Badiou states that the meaning of “we are 
nothing” does not designate the nothing-ness of those who proclaim it, but it 
means “they are nothing in the world as it is, when it comes to appear 
politically.”(Badiou 2009, 131) In this sense, they are nothing from the point of 
view of their political appearance in a world. In this sense, the social and 
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economic being of proletariat is not the question. The question is proletariat’s 
existence in the political world. 
Making a distinction between being and existence, Badiou states a 
transcendental relationship between multiplicity and inscription in the world. In 
this sense, any multiplicity has a degree of existence in the world. “The fact of 
existing qua appearing in a determinate world, is inevitably associated with a 
certain degree of appearance in that world, with an intensity of appearance, 
which we can also call intensity of existence.” (Badiou 2009, 128) As the 
multiplicity has different elements in itself, there is a totality which constitutes 
its existence in a world. Nonetheless, Badiou stresses the fact that “there is 
always one component in that multiplicity whose appearance is measured by 
the lowest degree.”(Badiou 2009, 129) In a multiplicity, then, there is at least 
one element appearing with the minimal existence, which is equivalent to non-
existence. “From the world’s point of view, existing as little as possible is the 
same as not existing at all.”(Badiou 2009, 130) 
The auto/biographical is this non-existent element in the project of 
pure reason, which has the lowest degree of appearance and a minimal 
existence. I would like to remind you here that the being of the 
auto/biographical is not in doubt for the philosophers of pure reason. 
Nonetheless, it is inscribed to the philosophical text with a necessary minimal 
existence for the sake of the purity of reason. For Badiou, “What we call ‘life’ 
our ‘our life’ is often a transition from a world in which we appear with a lower 
degree of existence to a world in which our degree of existence is much more 
intense. That is what a moment of life, a lived experience, is.” (Badiou 2009, 
129) In this sense, there should a transition from the world of personal 
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experience to the world of philosophy, although an absolute transition is 
always impossible and it (the auto/biographical) remains in that world as a non-
existence. At this point, Badiou claims: 
[I]n the sense that Bergson says that philosophers have only 
one idea, in my view, what is at stake in Derrida’s work … is 
the inscription of the non-existent. And the recognition, in the 
work of inscribing the non-existent, that its inscription is, 
strictly speaking, impossible. What is at stake in Derrida’s 
writing -and here ‘writing’ designates a thought-act- is the 
inscription of the impossibility of the non-existence as the 
form of its inscription. (Badiou 2009, 132) 
Accordingly, Derrida is the opposite of a hunter. Derrida’s work aims 
the inscription of the non-existent, also recognizing the fact that it is 
impossible. And this work is not to be done by grasping or capturing, since 
grasping it would destroy it. “To be in the world is to be marked by discourses, 
marked even in our flesh, body, sex and so on. Derrida’s thesis, Derrida’s 
conclusion, the source of Derrida’s desire is that, whatever form that discursive 
imposition may take, there is point that escapes that imposition, and that we 
can call a vanishing point.”(Badiou 2009, 133) There is, then, a vanishing point 
which escapes the imposition of eliminating the contingent, the desire, and the 
auto/biographical. Derrida’s work is, as a non-hunter, not to grasp this 
vanishing point, but to locate it. Like it is tried to be described above regarding 
the auto/biography as spectrality, vanishing point is “that which, when it is in 
place, is outside-place.”(Badiou 2009, 135) This is also the critique of 
metaphysics in a very Badiou-Derridean way: 
That went against philosophical custom, for which the basis 
of non-existence is nothingness… That is where the 
metaphysical error lies, the only metaphysical error that is 
irremediable. The metaphysical error par excellence is to 
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have identified the non-existent with nothingness. (Badiou 
2009, 140)    
As to both the auto/biographical and proletariat, the last remark is a 
hope: “That is why proletarians, who non-exist, can argue on the basis of their 
being, that ‘We are nothing, let us be all.’ That is the very definition of 
Revolution: a non-existent uses its being-multiple in order to declare that it will 
exist in the absolute sense. And for that to happen, we have to change the 
world of course, change the world’s transcendental.” (Badiou 2009, 141) 
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